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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
however, that the druggist was guilty of a breach of duty, in order to hold
him liable, it must be further shown that his breach of duty proximately
resulted in the injury complained of, namely, the death. McKibban V.
Baxter, 79 Nebr. 577.
According to the generally accepted theory of proximate cause the defendant's act must be the cause in fact or the causa sine qua non of the
injury. Westfield Gas, etc., v. Hinshaw, 22 Ind. App. 499, 53 N. E. 1069.
The sale of the acid here must have been the cause in fact of the death.
There was, however, an intervening cause, that being the suicide. The
suicide was an independent criminal act. It is well recognized that an
independent criminal act will break the chain of causation. The suicide
was such an intervening act as could not reasonably have been anticipated
here as the result of a sale of carbolic acid to the child, hence the suicide
broke the chain of causation.
There is another view of the question of proximate cause which has the
support of some very respectable authority. This view is a modern development and is rapidly gaining ground. According to this view the defendant's conduct is the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury when it subjects
the injured party to a hazard against which the law affords protection.
Grenn's Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927) 142. This analysis raises
the question, What is the purpose of the rule of law that discourages the
sale of poisons to very young children? The answer is, of course, that the
purpose of such a rule of law is to protect the children themselves from
injury that would result to them if they were freely permitted to purchase and handle poisons. This rule is not contemplated to protect adults
into whose hands the poisons might come as a result of a sale to children.
Thus the rule of law here did not protect against the particular hazard
encountered, namely, the suicide of the deceased.
Under either analysis presented the court can be supported in its holding that the injury to the appellee did not proximately result from a
breach of duty by the appellant.
T. H. F.
HIGHWAYS-DEDICATION-AcCEPTANCE BY PUBLIC USER-In 1872 P Co.
had purchased an addition to their right of way from M. The deed contained a provision that a path across P's tracks should be kept open as
"other street crossings are kept open." M had himself received the land
with a reservation that the strip be kept open for road purposes. Later
P bound itself in an agreement with M that the crossing would remain
6pen. A path ran from the crossing to M's home. P had done all the
work of repairing the crossing and had kept it open continuously, cutting
trains across it. The path had been continuously used by the public but
from 1886-1896 and 1907-1909 the path was barred at the entrance to M's
land to keep cattle out of P's right of way. P sues to enjoin city from
using the crossing. Held: Land was dedicated and accepted by city thru
long use by the public. Michigan Central R. Co. v. Michigan City, 169 N.
E. 873. German Bank v. Brose, 69 N. E. 300, in accord.
To dedicate land to public use there must be an intention on the part
of grantor to dedicate, acted upon and accepted by the municipality or the
general public. Williams v. Milley, 16 Ind. 362. Gillespie v. Duling, 41
Ind. App. 217, 83 N. E. 728. The actual intention to dedicate need not
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exist but must appear to exist. German Bank v. Brose, supra. Of the
three deeds here, the deed to M apparently did not amount to a dedication,
being to a private person, P. C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Warrum, 42 Ind. App.
179, 82 N. E. 924. The deed from M to P and the subsequent agreement
signed by P probably were sufficient, in Indiana, to prove P's intent even
though made to third parties since P declared that it was to be kept as
other street crossings, thus dedicating it to the public. Davidson v. City
of Birmingham, 212 Ala. 123, 101 So. 878. But even if intent was not sufficiently shown by the deeds it might have been proved through acts of
P and need not by formal document. Cromer v. State, 21 Ind. App. 502,
52 N. E. 239. The dedication must be affirmative and intent must be clearly
shown. Miller v. City of Indianapolis, 123 Ind. 196, 24 N. E. 228. P maintained this crossing as a street intersection for over 20 years; and keeping a road open for the statutory period was presumed to be dedication
under Sec. 8709 Burns 1926. Ross v. Thompson, 78 Ind. 90; Carr v. Kolb,
99 Ind. 53. There was no showing that it was kept open mainly for P's
convenience. Talbot v. Grace, 30 Ind. 389, 95 Am. Dec. 704.
The question of acceptances, presented here, appears slightly more difficult. Acceptance by the public or by the municipality in the dedication
inevocable. Mansur v. State, 60 Ind. 357; P. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v.
Warrum, 29 Ind. App. 269, 63 N. E. 36. This acceptance need not be by
formal ratification; any action by the municipality such as repairs or improvement is sufficient. Town of Fowler v. Linquist, 138 Ind. 566, 37 N. E.
133. Nor is positive action absolutely necessary. Summers v. State, 51
Ind. 201. There is a presumption in favor of acceptance where the gift is
beneficial to the public. Archer v. Salines City, 93 Cal. 43, 166 L. R. A.
145. But this presumption does not exist and some positive act is required
where the gift would impose a burden upon the public, as in the case of
maintenance of highways. Tiffany Real Property,Vol. II, p. 1876.
In the principal case there had been no formal or informal acceptance
of the dedication other than long continued use. Where the use has run
so long that public interests are affected, acceptance is presumed. Masson v. Skillman, 127 Ind. 330, 26 N. E. 676. The statement of the principal case that the majority opinion is that mere use will prove acceptance
is upheld by German Bank v. Brose, supra, and by dicta in Thompson v.
Ross, supra. Certainly the modern tendency is in accord, even going so
far as to charge municipalities with the duty of repairing. 8 Ruling Case
Law 900.
The placing of the bars at the entrance to M's land was pertinent to the
questions of acceptance by the public user and revocation before acceptance (Steinbuer v. City of Tell City, 146 Ind. 490, 45 N. E. 1056; Lightcap
v. Town of North Judson, 154 Ind. 43, 55 N. E. 952) but, under the facts,
such act did not constitute revocation before acceptance by public user.
J. S. G.
INSURANCF-RECENT CONSTRUCTIONS OF CONDITIONS IN POLICIES (VOL.
169 N. E. REP.)-In the interpretation of contracts of insurance it is
almost impossible, in any case, to apply abstract rules of construction with
any degree of certainty. While general principles have been developed, and
are enunciated in almost every decision of the courts upon the subject,

